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The Enduring Enchantment: (Or the Epistemic Privilege of Modernity and Where to Go from Here)

Saurabh Dube's invitation to participate in this collection called my attention to enduring enchantments that, created by the self-defining discourse of modernity, acquire an ontological dimension beyond the discourse itself. "Modernity" has, in these enduring enchantments, a double role. On the one hand, it is part of a series of oppositions (modernity/tradition, colony/modernity) and, on the other, modernity names the paradigm in which the enchantment of enduring oppositions is reproduced and maintained. Dube stated that

this issue of the *South Atlantic Quarterly* does not propose a general solution to questions of the oppositions between tradition and modernity, ritual and rationality, myth and history, community and state, emotion and reason, and East and West. Indeed, it eschews immanent readings that relentlessly seek the "foundations" and "origins" of these binaries in Enlightenment principles and post-Enlightenment traditions only to cast out from imagination and understanding diverse human energies and enormous historical passions—from

the first world through the fourth world—that have laid claim on these oppositions and animated these antinomies. Rather, “Enduring Enchantments” will work toward critical readings and substantive discussions of the *key categories of tradition, community, colony and modernity*—and, when they bear on this dialogue, the crucial constructs of the subaltern and nation—in view of the place and the persistence of overwrought oppositions that have ordered cultures and pasts in academic analyses and everyday understanding.

My thesis is that the self-conception of the European Renaissance was, basically, expressed in a temporal and spatial matrix that corresponded to a religious and alphabetic/historiographic imaginary supported by the invention of the printing press. This matrix was transformed in the late eighteenth century as the alphabetic-historiographic imaginary was replaced by the emergence of a new type of discourse, political economy.¹ Political economy came into the picture with a geopolitical concept of time that displaced, in the West, the hegemony of the Christian idea of time and of space. Christianity told the story of humankind from its origins in God’s creation and distributed space in three continents, each of them attributed to one of Noah’s sons (Asia to Sem; Africa to Ham and Europe to Japheth).² The secularization of time was, interestingly enough, parallel to the emergence of political economy. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Adam Smith had no doubt about the “advancement” of colonized sites (places) with the help of the colonial countries. If today, the rhetoric is that “technology will lift poverty,” at the end of the eighteenth century the rhetoric was the following:

The colony of a civilized nation which takes possession either of a waste country, or of one so thinly inhabited, that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other human society. The colonists carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and other useful arts, superior to what can grow up of its own accord in the course of many centuries among savage and barbarous nations. They carry out with them too the habit of subordination, some notion of the regular government which takes place in their own country, of the system of laws which supports it, and of regular administration of justice, and naturally establish something of the same kind of the new settlement.³

Thus, the colonists not only “carried with them” all those aspects that Adam Smith enumerated but, most importantly, they carried with them the conceptualization of what they carried with them, that is, the conceptualization that Smith puts forward here but that became naturalized. It was then natural for Karl Marx, a little more than half a century after Adam Smith, to understand the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries as a period of primitive accumulation. By doing so, he reinforced both the temporal direction of the history of capitalism to its point of arrival in the “mother country” (Marx’s expression), and rearticulated the temporal relations within the colonies. In “Western Europe, the homeland of political economy,” said Marx, “the process of primitive accumulation has more or less been accomplished. As a consequence, Marx observed that

In Western Europe, *the homeland of political economy*, the process of primitive accumulation has been more or less been accomplished. Here the capitalist regime has either directly subordinated to itself the whole of the nation’s production, or, where economic relations are less developed, it has at least indirect control of those social layers which, although they belong to the antiquated mode of production, still continue to exist side by side with it in a state of decay. To this ready-made world of capital, the political economist applies the notions of law and of property inherited from a precapitalist world, with all the more anxious zeal and all the greater unction, the more loudly the facts cry out in the face of his ideology.⁴

And Marx adds: “It is otherwise in the colonies.”

In the colonies the capitalist regime “constantly comes up against the obstacle presented by the producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labor, employs that labor to enrich himself instead of the capitalist.”⁵ Most likely Marx was thinking about Indians in South Asia under British rule. However, the conceptualization of economics based on the laws that Smith and Marx expanded had its foundation in religious discourse, also based on the law, established three centuries before Marx but under different economic and colonial conditions. In other words, the transformation of mercantile capitalism in the sixteenth century due to the “discovery of America” resulted in what Marx called “primitive accumulation.” What apparently Marx was referring to but not naming as such was “colonial (primitive) accumulation.” However, Marx was very much imbued with the already-

entrenched (in the nineteenth century) belief in the linear march of time and progress of universal history. The accumulation of capital that resulted from the exploitation of the silver and gold mines in Potosi, Zacatecas, and Ouro Preto (by Spaniards and the Portuguese), as well as the exploitation of the Caribbean lands and of African Slaves (in the French, British, and Dutch plantations), was not the same as the “modern (primitive) accumulation” in Europe itself. That is, that kind of accumulation which, since Europe was the “homeland of political economy,” had been already accomplished. For once, race was not a significant element in *modern* accumulation—that is, in Europe—while it was the essence of colonial accumulation. Indeed, it was race that became a foundational category in the organization and the exploitation of labor in colonial accumulation, while it was class that became the foundation category in modern accumulation.⁶ Lewis Gordon pointed out the same phenomenon from a different perspective:

In Europe, class is so indigenous to its environment that it emerges even in European efforts to socialism. One can “feel” class in Europe as one can feel the air that one breathes. In the U.S. [and I will say in the Americas including the Caribbean, W.M.], however, the effort to escape (yet retain) Europe took the form of homogenizing European identities into a whiteness framed on the premise of racially falling being. Race, then, became an endemic motive of New World [and of course the New World is larger than the United States, although the United States is included in the New World, W.M.], and that is why one can “feel” race here as one can the air that one breathes. . . .⁷

Now, both Smith and Marx underlined the extreme relevance of the “discovery” of the Cape of Good Hope (1488) and the Americas to the history of capital (commercial and then industrial). The first allowed Christian Europe to establish commercial relations with the economic centers of China and India, while the “discovery” of America brought gold, silver, and goods from the Caribbean plantations to Europe and, later, to “Western Europe” (Holland, England, France, Germany). Certainly, Smith and Marx made their remarks in a secular prose that contrasted with the triumphal enunciation by which Francisco de Gómara, historian of Hernan Cortes’s conquest of Mexico, framed the discovery of America in the history of the Christian Western World. For Gómara, the discovery of America (he does not pay

attention to the Cape of Good Hope) was, without a doubt, the most extraordinary event in the history of the world since its very creation was by the will of God. In the dedication of his *Hispania Vitrix* to Charles V, Gómara states,

La mayor cosa despues de la creación del mundo sacando la encarnación y muerte del que lo crió, es el descubrimiento de Indias. . . . Quiso Dios descubrir las Indias en vuestro tiempo y a vuestros vasallos, para que las convirtiesedes a su santa ley. . . . Comenzaron las conquistas de Indios acabada la de los moros, porque siempre guerreasen espanioles contra infieles.⁸

The most important event after the creation of the World, beyond the incarnation and death of its Creator, was the discovery of the Indies. . . . It was God's will to discover the Indies during your time and the time of your vassals so the Indies can be converted into his Sacred Law. . . . The conquest of the Indies began once the conquers of the Moors ended, and that is because it was God's will that Spaniards be always at war with the infidels.

Bringing a Spanish and Christian historian to this picture may seem far-fetched. I hope to show that it is not. Smith and Marx transformed the "foundational" discourse of enduring enchantment from the language of Christian historiography, law, and rhetoric to the language of political economy. Furthermore, Smith and Marx were not looking at the discovery of America from the perspective of the Spanish empire, be it triumphal like Gómara's or critical like Bartolomé de las Casas's. The discourse of Smith and Ricardo, however, carried over the enchantments of the discovery of America, colonial commerce (Smith) and colonial (primitive) accumulation (Marx).

The excesses committed by Spanish "conquistadors," so well exploited later on by England and France to take over the colonial power enjoyed by Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had its own criticism among Spanish missionaries as well. It is well known that las Casas was used by the promoters of the "Black Legend" to show how bad things were in the Spanish colonies such that even the Spaniards like las Casas were horrified.⁹ We are no longer persuaded, today, by the rhetoric used by an imperial power against another imperial power. If las Casas was the activist who denounced the abuses of the "conquistadors," Francisco de Vitoria and the Salamanca school established, starting around 1539, a system of inter-

national law based on the universal perspective of Christianity. Vitoria and the Salamanca school did not invent the law, of course. They worked seriously to put in place a system of international law that would acknowledge the “rights” of the Indians as well as of the Spanish. For instance, the Indians’ right to keep their property was one of the fundamental issues explored and defended by Vitoria. The rights of the Spaniards to be in Indian territory and preach Christianity were also defended. While Spaniards, according to Vitoria, did not have the right to expropriate Indians’ property, Indians had no right to exclude Spaniards from their territory and even less to stop them from spreading Christianity.¹⁰ Political economy was not in place, and economic issues were subsumed under historical, religious, and legal discourses. The situation was quite different from what Smith and Marx were looking at in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And yet, in different ways, Vitoria, Smith, and Marx embodied the existing power relations of which they, from different perspectives, pretended to be thoroughly critical. In the case of Vitoria, the Indians whose rights were being defended had no opportunity to voice their opinions about the rights they were supposed to have. In the case of Smith, the critique was directed toward the areas of the world that needed colonialism for their own advancement toward *modernity*, a word not used by Smith although its spirit was implied. And Marx condemned the exploitation of the capitalist mode of production. Everything was decided in the discourse of theological law and political economy, without any say from the rest of the world. In that sense, the three of them embodied the power relations of which they pretended to be critical. Due to the worldwide expansion of Christian, liberal, and Marxist discourses, we are in a similar position still today. There is no longer even the possibility of attaining and pretending to be a metacritical voice, from the left, that condemns all the failures of leftist-like discourses, pretending to find a place uncontaminated from the embodiment of existing power relations. To find a place, finally, in which, like God, everybody else could be criticized by the embodiment of the existing power relations.

I argue, instead, for border thinking as one possible way of breaking the enchantments and the (vicious) circle of capitalism and its internal critiques. Thus, imperial rhetoric disqualifying other imperial powers as well as the critique of imperial rhetoric became part of the expansion of Western religions, law, and economy but mainly of Western conceptions of religion, law, and economy. That is why there is no possibility of occupying a God-

like position, from the left, that is not embodied in existing power relations and that would break away from enduring enchantments. This, once again, is another reason for the endurance of the dichotomies upon which the very conceptualization of the modern/colonial world was based from Vitoria to Smith to Marx, in reference to the example discussed earlier in this essay.¹¹

During the European Renaissance people around the world were mainly located in space, not in time. Christianity did not link “the infidels” with being less developed or behind in time. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries “the denial of coevalness,” as Johannes Fabian so lucidly analyzed, emerging from the European enlightenment and particularly in G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophy of history was nonsensical in the Renaissance. The infidels were not primitive or distant in time. They were either in distant geographical places, like the Indians, or in different spheres of beliefs, like the Moors or the Jews. Christians did not classify the world in terms of a point of arrival in time, the point of arrival in History, but in space. The point of arrival was the final judgment, not the present as in secular history. The Christian map was drawn in consonance with Christian narratives of origin. In this case, the three sons of Noah served to locate continents, therefore people, and to rank the continents in relation to Japheth, Noah’s preferred son. Japheth was located in the West, in the lands of Western Christians, while Sem and Sham were located in Asia and Africa, respectively.

It was during the eighteenth century and the European Enlightenment that people outside of Europe began to be located in time. The secular idea of “primitives” replaced that of the “infidels.” By the time Hegel wrote his lessons in the philosophy of history, the east of the world with respect to Europe was situated in the past, where history began but where it was no longer dwelling. China and India and Japan no longer coexisted with Europe. They belonged to a different “time.” The “present” of History was located in Europe. The “denial of coevalness” established the dividing line between “modernity and tradition,” but the distinction between both was created by the discourse of modernity, not by the discourse of tradition. Tradition did not have its own discourse. It was created by the discourse that defined modernity. To be modern became an ideal and the standards of these ideas were established by the discourse that defined modernity as the location in time of the ideals to be attained. In fact, tradition was an invention very much like modernity, a necessary invention in order to define modernity and to locate it in Europe, in Western Europe, England,

France, and Germany. But of course what really counts is not that it was an invention but rather the geopolitical order and the historical consequences of such an invention. During the Renaissance the distinction between “les anciens et les modernes” was established in European history itself. “Les anciens” referred to Europe’s own past, while the “primitives” belonged to history outside of Europe, conceived either as the “past” (China, India), the “the future of History” (America), or people without history (Africa). Thus, Hegel’s lessons in the philosophy of history were the canonical narrative of both the space-time matrix established in the European Renaissance and the transformed matrix of the European Enlightenment. Thus, Hegel (with the help of Kant) set the stage for the enduring enchantments being discussed here. Secular thinkers criticized religion that became the “opium of the people,” although Christianity remained complicit with secular discourse, since Christianity could have not been placed at the same level of “opium of the people” with Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, or even Judaism! The complicity between secularism and Christianity is clear today in the enactment of international relations and global politics. Some religion had to be superior to others even if “faith” cannot be maintained at the same level as “reason.” The conflict between Palestine and Israel is not of course unrelated to the imaginary, the tensions, the complicity, and the hatred generated by the imaginary of the modern/colonial world and the articulation of differences and hierarchies. And all the talk on the “clash of civilizations” is very much the natural consequence of the invention of modernity and tradition. It is then necessary to replace *tradition* with *coloniality* and to make of coloniality a place of enunciation from where the invention of modernity can be disclosed and its “natural” underpinning revealed.

The modern/colonial world was founded and sustained through a geopolitical organization of the world that, in the last analysis, consisted of an ethnoracial foundation.¹² In the sixteenth century *race* did not yet have the meaning it acquired in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the racial classifications from the eighteenth century on based on skin color rather than in blood purity cannot be understood without the former.¹³ The transformation from blood purity to skin color runs parallel to the transformation from the hegemony of religious discourses grounded in faith to the hegemony of secular discourses grounded in reason. The persistence of bodies of knowledge distributed between “enchanted spaces” and “modern places,” of traditional and modern knowledge, of African philosophy

and philosophy *tout court*, has been the flexibility of modernity in implementing coloniality of power and, therefore, of Western "racism." In "modern space," epistemology was first Christian and then White. In "enchanted places," wisdom, and not epistemology, was first non-Christian (and this was one of the reasons why Christianity remained complicit with its critics, the secular philosophers) and later on of color. Islam, for instance, became a colored religion while Christianity, and particular Protestant Christianity, became whiter after the reformation.¹⁴ One can surmise that the persistence of binary classifications then is due to two interrelated factors. On the one hand, and as I already mentioned, Christianity is a member of the set of World Religions and a particular moment of World History. Simultaneously, Christianity is the epistemic location that created and implanted such classification. None of the other members in the set of World Religions or World History have provided an equally powerful and enduring classification. In this regard, both Christianity and modernity share the privilege of a double location. First, being one among many of a set of religions and historical epochs and, second, being the only religion and historical epoch from which all other religions and historical epochs are established with the epistemic privilege of Christianity and modernity (and also postmodernity). The enchantments will endure, in spite of the work by the critics of the Empire whom, in spite of ourselves/themselves, would remain embodied in the imperial relations of power. Christianity and its aftermath, secular epistemology, had the privilege of being at the same time part of the totality enunciated and the universal place of enunciation while being able to make-believe that the place of enunciation was a nonplace. Consequently, the order of the enunciated was the natural order of the world and the world, alas, was organized in dichotomous hierarchies.

The "Other" in space, time, belief, skin color, or place of birth was of a particular kind, a part of humanity in the world that was unknown, until then, to the Christian Europeans who were debating the question of the just war against them or the rights of the people to property and autonomy. Modernity and tradition did not yet define a binary opposition. Nor did myth and history, although the "lack of history" Spaniards attributed to the Indians would become, later on, filled with the category of myth. State and community were not in opposition since the concept of the state, in the sixteenth century, was of a religion-state and not a nation-state as it would become conceptualized in secular eighteenth century. The opposition between emo-

tion and reason was not yet in place for several reasons, one of which is that while “emotion” became a necessary component of the secular conceptualization of the subject-ego, endowed with reason, it was not a distinctive feature of the individual-believer endowed with faith and injected with fear toward God. The distinction between the former and the latter is related and runs parallel to the difference between the religion-state and the nation-state, between communities of believers and communities of citizens. The secular concept of reason was conceptualized, in part, through the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, by the detachment of the body from the mind and the erasure of secondary qualities from the pure work of reason that Immanuel Kant theorized with such intensity.¹⁵

Now, while the existing dichotomies are the result of the mobilization of a discourse that under the name and the positive value of modernity produces colonial differences and disqualifies the opposing binary that it creates, the devalued set in the paradigm gives rise to several possible outcomes. The first would be to accept that one is traditional, that one does not belong to the standard of “rationality,” that one has mythic narrative but not history, that one is black and not white, and so on. This outcome is a passive acceptance of an inferior condition. A second option would be to affirm the values that the discourse of modernity has devalued and negated. This outcome is clearly antimodern and may end up in a fundamental defense of what modernity has devalued. The third option is the one that accepts, first, that double consciousness is a condition of the colonial paradigm and the colonial paradigm consists of a set of binary oppositions resulting from the implementation of coloniality of power. Double consciousness is a necessary condition for the mobilization of border thinking, which is by definition beyond the national discourses of bounding territorial states (that is, what is often called nation-state), may lead us to critical cosmopolitanism as an intellectual, political, and ethical project.¹⁶

If we agree that modernity and the paradigm of binary oppositions such as modernity/tradition is a business of the second and secular modernity—that is, Western Europe (mainly England, France, and Germany after the reformation)—then the stories I was telling about the European Renaissance become situated in premodernity or the early-modern period, as the French historians from the Annals Schools would say. Thus, the way is paved for a modern period in the same narrow geopolitical line of the Eurocentric concept of historical time. Such a concept of modern historical time silenced

the rest of the world, assuming the superiority of the “present” and of a type of “human being” that was based in the ideal of the Renaissance, that is, an ideal of being based on the paradigmatic example of a white male.¹⁷ Once we are aware of the narrow frame of mind implanted by intellectuals of the second modernity, it is not surprising that Michel Foucault locates the “beginning” of the discourse on war and race in 1630. These biopolitics are the biopolitics of the Europe of nations, not of the constitution of Europe itself through international relations and the making of the colonial difference, as was discussed in the sixteenth century mainly by the Salamanca school and the work of Francisco de Vitoria. The debate on the just war against the Indians occupied the entire sixteenth century in Spain and Europe. But that Europe, the Europe of the sixteenth century, apparently is the traditional one and not the modern Europe Foucault is talking about. In other words, the thirty years war in Europe (in the middle of which Foucault locates the beginning of the discourse of biopolitics) *presupposes* the consolidation of Europe through the colonial Christian missions and the reformation.¹⁸ Which presupposes, also, the wealth provided by the gold and silver of Potosi and Zatecatas and the Caribbean plantations. And also the consolidation of the French and English economies through their exploitation of the Caribbean plantations, the massive transportation of slaves, and the foundation of European nations that will emerge between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the post-Napoleon colonial expansion. This racial war, the war of England and France against Spain, was certainly a war of imperial conflicts and of racial categorization among and between European emerging nations, as Kant made clear from a pragmatic point of view of anthropology.¹⁹ There is a common knowledge that seldom appears articulated in a clear and concise prose, as it does in the editorial of the International Society of the Study of European Ideas:

In the seventeenth century what had been known as Christendom became Europe and a new civilization came into being: European civilization. From then onwards Europe mirrored itself not only in its Greco-Roman legacy and its Judeo-Christian religion but also in the world's other civilizations discovered by European travelers.²⁰

This image takes Western Europe as the heart of Europe, as Hegel says. For someone who does not identify him- or herself with European civilization, History can begin someplace else. For example,

Toward the end of the fifteenth century what had been known as Tawantinsuyu, Anahuac and Abya-Yala by the inhabitants of what it is today the Andean Region, Mexico and Panama respectively, but also what is today the Insular Caribbean, became *Indias Occidentales*, and then America and then Latin America. A new civilization was born of the Christian and Castilian colonization, a civilization that was reproduced later on in Africa and in Asia by the European civilization that was born in the seventeenth century. A civilization of diversity, the “colonial/postcolonial civilization” characterizes itself by the diversity of local histories emerging from the encounter between Christian Spain and European civilization with America, Africa and Asia. The European civilization, as described above, did not leave its marks in the Caribbean until after the French revolution. From early seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century French and British presence in the Caribbean was fully devoted to plantation economy rather than to the civilizing mission. The colonial/postcolonial civilization has received several names: transmodernity, subaltern modernities, or alternative modernities.²¹

The enduring enchantment of binary oppositions seems to be related to the enduring image of a European civilization and of European history told from the perspective of Europe itself. Europe is not only the center (that is, the center of space and the point of arrival in time) but also has the epistemic privilege of being the center of enunciation. And in order to maintain the epistemic privilege it is necessary, today, to assimilate to the epistemic perspective of modernity and accuse emerging epistemology of claiming epistemic privileges! The logic of ethnic food seems to be at work in epistemology as well. The only nonethnic food in any European or U.S. fair would be precisely the food that is identified with European (and I do not mean “eastern Europe”!) or U.S. cuisine. All other food has the “privilege” of being ethnic (and probably related to tradition, folklore, popular culture, and the like). While capitalism moved from Europe to the United States, then to Japan, and now to China, epistemology apparently remains located in Europe, which is taken, simultaneously, as the nonplace (or transparently universal) locus of enunciation. The complementary relations between the accumulation of capital and knowledge created the conditions for a self-definition of modernity. To be modern is either to assimi-

late to the self-fashioning of modernity or to oppose it from the perspective of modernity itself, such as from the opposition opened up by Marxism. Therefore, dichotomies, modern spaces and enchanted places reproduced themselves under different masks.

Let's review some of their foundations. The temporal matrix pronounced the Middle Ages as the necessary "before" to justify the need of a "renaissance."²² The spatial matrix organized the difference between Christianity, on the one hand, and the pagans and infidels on the other. The argument that I developed here addresses two interrelated issues embedded in the enduring oppositions that can be traced back to the European Renaissance and to the invention of America.²³ One, as I already mentioned, is the legitimization of a self-endowed double role enjoyed by the first set of terms of the binary oppositions being discussed in the issue of *The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* devoted to the (temporal) decolonization of the Middle Ages. Which, indirectly, made me think of the need "to decolonize traditions colonized by modernity."²⁴ Each term implies the other. *Modernity*, for example, implies *West*, *reason*, *history*, *state*, and *rationality*. *Rationality* implies *modernity*, *West*, and so on. Each term is part of the enunciated, but all of them are, at the same time, pervasively and invisibly the foundation of the classification itself—that is, of the enunciation. What we have here is a different version of the coloniality of power, since the second set of terms are part of the colonization of time within Europe itself and the colonization of space *and* time in the colonial world outside Europe. The terms in the complementary side of the paradigm (*tradition*, *ritual*, *myth*, *community*, and *emotion*) also are implied in each other. *Colony*, *East*, and *tradition* imply *ritual*, *myth*, *community*, and *emotion*. *Colony* implies *tradition*, *myth*, and so on. But, contrary to the first set of terms in the paradigm, none of them are part of the enunciation. They all have been relegated to the enunciated only. What is invisible in this paradigm are perhaps the reasons for its enduring enchantments, the "coloniality of power" and, therefore, the fact that the discourse of modernity (the enunciation) that defined modernity (the enunciated) was successful in hiding the fact that there cannot be modernity without coloniality. Thus, if coloniality becomes the place of the enunciation, then the second set of terms in the paradigm (*colony*, *ritual*, *tradition*, and so on) loses its passive role of being the supporting actor of a triumphant self-defined modernity.

The European Renaissance provided the logic on which the philosophers


of the European Enlightenment could build and modify the logic related the content of modernity and of tradition. The binary oppositions that we are exploring in this issue of *SAQ* were articulated during and after the European Enlightenment and consisted of “filling in the blanks” of a “before” in European history in relation to which the Renaissance was precisely self-conceived as Renaissance. The notion of *newness* began to be associated with modernity. The before was the period to which the pagans and infidels were assigned, and pagans and infidels were defined as such by the rhetoric of Christianity. In other words, there was not such a thing as infidels without the rhetoric of Christianity appointing itself as the measuring stick for the classification of people according to their beliefs. When the Indians of the New World (and here we have the “newness” in space) came into the picture, a new dimension of the difference emerged, and it was that difference that became one of the pillars of modernity/coloniality, of the modern/colonial world. Pagans and infidels in time, and in a shared territory, had to be dealt with as infidels in space and in an alien territory.

West and East, Occident and Orient came into the picture. The Spanish possessions were divided between *Indias Occidentales* (the Americas) and *Indias Orientales* (Philippines, Molucas), as I have already mentioned.²⁵ Occidentalism in the sixteenth century became the necessary grounding to conceive Orientalism in the eighteenth century.²⁶ And, on the other hand, the geographical paradigms for the establishment of a series of “lack” and “wrongs” were established according to the Christian religious and secular epistemic frames. Briefly, the European Renaissance established the matrix for a double colonization, of time and of space. The colonization of time resulted in the invention of the Middle Ages in European history. The colonization of space meant the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews from Christian Spain and the conquest of the *Indias Occidentales* on a “discovery” of a New World.

The spatial colonial difference emerged toward the end of the fifteenth through the sixteenth centuries. It was the triumph of Christianity over the Moors and the Jews, in late-fifteenth-century Spain that laid out the foundations of the enduring paradigm of binary oppositions and the epistemic privilege of modern epistemology from the Renaissance to today. Jews and Moors embraced the wrong God and the wrong beliefs. The American Indians were not in the intellectual horizon of Christianity and, therefore, were distinguished by their “lacks” rather than their “wrongs.” They lack alpha-

betical writing and therefore do not have history. They worship plants and nature and therefore do not have religion. They lack the logical way of reasoning that was put in place by the Christian thinkers of medieval Europe. Although the Aztecs' and Incas' social organization impressed the Spaniards very much, they did not have a conception of their lack of logical explicitness from Roman law, or at least the Spaniards were unable to see the logic of the Incas and Aztecs underlying their social organization. In the Caribbean the scenario is more complex due to, in the first place, the extermination of the native population and, in the second, the arrival of massive contingents of African slaves. Paget Henry, a philosopher from Antigua reflecting on these issues, has recently mapped the imperial/colonial conditions under which an Afro-Caribbean philosophy emerged. Thus, within the imperial frameworks of the modern/colonial world, "the original content of Caribbean philosophy emerged as a series of extended debates over projects of colonial domination between four major social groups: Euro-Caribbeans, Amerindians, Indo-Caribbeans and Afro-Caribbeans."²⁷ In any case, the colonial difference in the Andes, Mesoamerica, and the Caribbean is the foundation of both the colonial differences created by colonial discourses, and the differential colonial accumulation that ensued from that historical foundational moment. The binary oppositions, which are indeed the colonial difference created from the epistemic privilege of colonial modernities, are the conditions under which subjectivities have been formed in the process of differential colonial accumulation. To imagine possible futures beyond the enduring enchantments of the differential colonial accumulation of binary oppositions would imply a redressing in the direction in which the coloniality of power has been implemented in the past five hundred years. And that process is already taking place. It is not, however, a project consisting of a mere reversal of the epistemic privilege of modernity, that is, of displacing the privileges from the first set of the paradigm to the second set. It would consist of taking advantage of the double consciousness that emerges, out of necessity, in all those subjectivities that have been formed under the second set of terms. For instance, belonging to a world that has been classified as traditional and irrational means that any attempt to mobilize from that position will have to assume that the conditions of being irrational and traditional have been allocated from the epistemic privilege of a mythical space/time called "modernity." However, since the epistemic privilege goes hand in hand with its hegemony, its displace-

ment implies subsuming the first set of terms in the paradigm into the second by making of it a locus of enunciation as legitimate as the first. This is the epistemic operation I have conceptualized as border thinking, border gnosis, or border epistemology.²⁸



Thus, there are three important moments before the European Enlightenment in the South and North Atlantic out of which the Enlightenment itself and what followed would be only partially understood. The first is the double articulation of the invention of the Middle Ages in the self-definition of the Renaissance and the victory of Christianity over the Jews and the Moors at the end of the fifteenth century in Castile. The second moment was the discourse of the “invention of America” and the verbalization of the colonial difference in three different and interrelated domains. One was the need to revise the notion of humanness and the human being due to the appearance of the “Indians” in the European consciousness. This need gave rise to the “right of the people,” widely discussed in the school of Salamanca and in Europe in general. The right of the people was indeed the conceptualization of the “right of the other” and the first expression of international law in the modern/colonial world. The second was related to conversion and to the brutal campaign that took the name of “the extirpation of idolatry.” The extirpation of idolatry was a process of “deculturation” (as Cuban historian Moreno Fraginals puts it to describe slavery in the New World).²⁹ Deculturation, to Moreno Fraginals, consists of a conscientious process with the goal of economic exploitation, through which those in power proceed to “remove” knowledges and memories of a given human group. These processes facilitate, according to Fraginals, the expropriation of natural resources of a territory in which the human group in question dwells and, at the same time, the use of the human community as nonqualified and cheap force of labor. He further adds that deculturation processes of this type have been very common since the early colonization of the New World and the main targets have been Amerindians and African slaves.³⁰ And the third was the fact that Spanish missionaries and men of letters appointed themselves to write the history that, according the Spanish men of letters, Amerindians did not have. In these three parallel and complementary processes there were of course mixed positions. At one end of the spectrum were those who considered Amerindians subhuman and justified war, dispossession of

property, and “extirpation of idolatry,” memories, and knowledges. At the other end were those who recognized the humanity of Amerindians but couldn’t overcome the fact that as humans they were still inferior to the Spaniards.

If these three lines of argumentation prevailed during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the eighteenth century was the scenario of radical changes, both in the rearticulation of the colonial difference and in the inventions of the South of Europe and the imperial difference. It is in this scenario that the dichotomies under consideration were put in place. Furthermore, a new set of actors entered into the game: the so-called Creoles in the Spanish colonies who began to voice their position vis-à-vis the previous Spanish colonial discourse, and the emergent colonial discourses put in place by French, British, and German intellectuals. This pre-Enlightenment moment informed the Enlightenment so much that it is known in the history of Latin America as “the debate over the New World,” although it remains ignored by the European historians of the Enlightenment and their followers. Let’s concentrate on three major issues in the configuration of this new scenario.

First, there was the radical displacement from Spanish discourse about *Indias Occidentales* to French, British, and German discourses on the New World. *New World* acquired at this moment a “new” meaning, and this displacement impinged directly on the ideas of modernity and tradition. The term and the concept of a New World played in an interesting way since the very concept of modernity was defined in complicity with the Old World. In the sixteenth century, the idea of the New World introduced by the Italian intellectual Pietro Martir d’Anghiera, who was living in Spain at the time of the Columbus and Vespucci voyages, meant that a world unknown to Europeans became visible. The distinction in the sixteenth century was between the New World (*Indias Occidentales*, and then America) and the Old World (Asia, Africa and Europe in the Christian cosmography). By the eighteenth century, in the debates over the New World, the New World (or America) was distinguished from the Old World (or Europe). Furthermore, the idea of the new was taken literally by European intellectuals like Buffon, de Paw, and l’Abee Reynal to mean, first, “newness” literally and, second, to be associated with “youth,” “immaturity” “weakness,” contrary to the Old World that was “mature” both physically and “mentally.” Within this tradition it is not surprising that Hegel asserts that history moves from east to west. While Asia

is the past and Europe the present, the “youth” of America designed “her” as the future and continuity of European history.³¹

Second, the “debate over the New World” was, during the eighteenth century, the main expression of colonial discourse, although it has not been much acknowledged beyond the history of Latin America. The contact between Europe and the east was, since the early fourteenth century, basically commercial. However, while the commercial contacts between European and Asian cities had been significant in the self-definition of Christendom and Europe up to the sixteenth century, from the sixteenth century on the discourse was performed on the basis of the colonial discourse built on the emerging Atlantic commercial circuits.³² It was the Atlantic commercial circuits (gold and silver from Zacatecas and Potosi, for Spain; Ouro Preto for the Portuguese; and sugar, coffee, and tobacco in the Caribbean plantations for the French and the British) in which European cities found an impressive source of wealth. Furthermore, in the sixteenth century the Atlantic commercial circuit was totally controlled by the Spanish and Portuguese. It was only in the seventeenth century that the Dutch, French, and English made their presence felt, particularly in the Caribbean, with the massive slave trade needed for the plantations. The Dutch East India Company and its English rival, the East India Company, were commercial enterprises that, on the one hand, did not generate the wealth provided by the Caribbean plantations, both for the Dutch and the English. On the other hand, the commerce with the “East Indies” was not—during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—complemented by a colonial discourse as the one put in place mainly by the Spaniards in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the French in the eighteenth century. The discourse of the “civilizing mission” as global design, and “orientalism” as a scholarly discourse justifying—albeit indirectly—the need of the civilizing mission, were put in place toward the end of the eighteenth and during the nineteenth centuries. There was also a series of historical circumstances that should be taken into account to understand these changes. The Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution, and the end of the Napoleon era created the condition for the expansions mainly of France and England in Asia and Africa. There was a totally different ethos, at this point, compared to the French and British possessions in the Caribbean and in North America during the seventeenth century.

Third, the word *colony*, which originates from the early Roman Empire,

is employed in the measurement of lands and city planning that involved both *mensores* (for the measurement and planning of urban spaces) and *agrimensores* (for the measurement and planning of country spaces). Curiously enough, Romans borrowed these administrative practices from the Greeks, of course, but also from other “Eastern” practices beyond.³³ In any event, the word *colony* moved into Western vernacular languages carrying with it the meaning it had in Latin as it was employed in the administration of the Roman Empire. Thus, *colony* is not related to *modernity* until later on, after a substantial transformation of its meaning. One can surmise that the colonies were similar to the communities that the Inca and Aztec “Empires” annexed at a later date, totally independent from the “influence” of the Roman Empire, to the central administration of Tawantinsuyu (in the Andes) and Anahuac (in Mesoamerica, today Mexico and Guatemala). Thus, the arrival of the Spaniards produced a significant change in the sense that the two empires, Aztec and Inca, became colonies of Spain. Therefore, the foundation of the modern/colonial world meant that empires became colonies and, of course, colonies also became everything under “colonial administration.” *Mensores* and *agrimensores* played a similar role in the Spanish Empire. In 1532 the Spanish Crown began a process of mapping and describing the territories or colonies under their possessions known as “relaciones geograficas de Indias.” But most important, the colonies in question were no longer established in an already-known space (*orbis terrarum*, *oikoumene*)³⁴ but in a new world whose inhabitants presented a problem for the emergent Spanish Empire (both as territory and as a territory governed by an emperor). When Charles became emperor of both Spain and Europe in 1516, the colonies in Europe and in the New World were clearly distinguished. One important distinction was that the original inhabitants of the New World (Indians) and the newcomers from Africa (African slaves) did not have the same civil position (later on, “citizen”) as the inhabitants of Europe. The colonies of the New World were colonies defined by the colonial difference. The colonial difference in the New World was twice articulated during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, as I already mentioned. First by the Spaniards, for whom one of the most convincing lines was that the discovery of the New World was the most significant event in world history since the creation of the world (Francisco de Gómara). Second, by French and German intellectuals in the eighteenth century, for whom *new* was taken literally as if the Americas (for the native inhabitants Tawantinsuyu, Anahuac,


and Abya-Yala), or the New World didn't exist until it was "discovered" by the Europeans! Fourth, with the discourse of the civilizing mission and of orientalism in particular, the idea of the "scientific" and the "industrial" revolutions became clear signs of modernity and civilization. The conviction that technology and sciences inspired among European intellectuals and men of state replaced convictions in religion and the *studia humanitates* during the period between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Thus, the current meaning assigned to *modernity/colony* and to the first set of terms in the paradigms of binary opposition was put in place. And this story is also helpful in understanding modern and colonial accumulation.



Let's now sketch the emergence of a worldwide double consciousness as a consequence of the imperial (and therefore hegemonic) imaginary of the modern/colonial world in its successive transformations. I introduced this topic earlier in this essay. There are two significant moments that deserve attention. The first one took place toward the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries in Tawantinsuyu and Anahuac. A significant number of indigenous intellectuals in both places had to deal with a situation involving the replacement of their memories, social organization, and way of life with the one being implanted by the newcomers. The question was not worded at this time as Du Bois worded it at the beginning of the twentieth century. But the "feeling" was similar. The word *nepantla* was invented by Nahuatl speakers to describe a situation that they perceived as "being between two worlds," while of course knowing that the power relations of these two worlds were not symmetric. It becomes clear that the consciousness, the double consciousness, was in place with a different name. Of course I am not arguing here about whom was the first to have double consciousness; rather I am arguing for the articulation and rearticulation of the colonial difference. The colonial difference, from the perspective of those who are at the receiving end (that is, those who are identified with tradition, ritual, myth, community, emotion, etc.) always generate a double consciousness, whether one assimilates in silence or deals with the situation by protesting.

Enduring enchantments can be explained by the fact that modernity, rationality, history, state, and reason are still taken as points of arrival, even when modernization is detached from Westernization. "Modernization

without Westernization” is a formula embraced by many non-Western intellectuals and state officers. However, it is not clear that *modernization* means justice, equality, health and education for all, and fair distribution of wealth. Modernization without Westernization implies, instead, an overcoming of the traditional organization of society and technological upgrade. The desire for modernization is always a desire emanating from “traditional,” “third world” or “postcolonial countries on the side of the colonized.” Modern societies do not have to become modern. Their problem is to remain modern. Thus, England became a postcolonial country after its decolonization in Africa and Asia, but we do not hear any claim for the modernization of England. We do hear, however, many claims from Indian progressive intellectuals who embrace the project of modernity, although not necessarily as Jürgen Habermas would have it.³⁵ Thus, there is a catch-22 in the opposition of modernity/tradition since the categories of *tradition*, *ritual*, *myth*, *community*, and *emotion* are not “realities” but categories that made possible the discourse and the very self-definition of *modernity*. One set of terms in the paradigm describes the exteriority created by the set of terms that are the point of reference of the paradigm of enduring oppositions. The exteriority doesn’t mean the “outside” but the exterior being created by the interior: the set of terms that function as a reference point. These are precisely the colonial conditions promoting the emergence of double consciousness and border thinking. The point here is that modernity and its categories are not only one part of the binary oppositions that are enunciated, but *modernity* is also a keyword in the enunciation of the binary oppositions themselves. In this regard, the binary oppositions we are discussing in this issue of SAQ correspond to the same logic of Western epistemology, from the Renaissance to today.



The enduring enchantments are no doubt related to the fact that in the paradigms of opposition, one set of terms has a double function. Modernity, rationality, state, reason, and history are, on the one hand, part of the opposition paradigm itself and, on the other, the locus of enunciation of the paradigm itself. That is to say, the paradigm of opposition is not being named from a neutral perspective uncontaminated by any of the terms of the opposition. The paradigm was an invention of the self-definition of modernity in the very act of conceiving modernity as an epoch and a point of arrival in

European history. It also became the universal locus of enunciation. When a regional locus of enunciation becomes universal, it acquires the force of controlling its own criticism. In the past few decades it became customary to argue in favor of the epistemic potential implied in the genealogy of knowledges that has been subalternized from the perspective of modern epistemology. Some of those who argued in favor of the political and epistemic legitimacy of subaltern voices have been more often than not accused by modern or postmodern right- and left-wing intellectuals of defending the “epistemic privilege” of the disempowered and of confusing epistemology with political slogans. In my view the debate framed in those terms is revealing of the fact that the only epistemic privilege still lies in modern epistemology and that subaltern perspectives are not of course endowed with an epistemic privilege. They do not need that privilege because what subaltern perspectives have is, indeed, an epistemic potential. An epistemic potential grounded in what for modern epistemology has been silence and darkness. The silence of the epistemically disinherited by and through the emancipation claims of modernity (think, for instance, of the Haitian revolution) and the darkness to which the world was reduced in order to sustain the epistemic privileges of modernity, its enduring enchantments.

Philosophers from the Arab-Islamic world have been dealing with the questions of tradition and modernity and how to imagine possible futures building from what is alive, today, in both “traditions”: the tradition of European modernity and the tradition of the Arab-Islamic world. Mohamed al-Jabri is one of these philosophers.³⁶ For him, Averroës is an anchor and a point of reference for such a task. His argument is based on the fact that in both the Christian-Latin and Islamic-Arabic Middle Ages, philosophers on both sides of languages and religions built on the physics of Aristotle. But what happened since then? Descartes built his philosophy on Galileo’s physics and, later on, Kant “advanced” over Descartes by building his own philosophy on Newton’s physics. Later on, Bachelard followed suit by building on quantum physics and the theory of relativity. The “temporal tradition” of European modernity built on itself and inscribed their own past into their own present. The colonization of the Middle Ages was the starting point to inscribe the past of modernity, Descartes, and to distinguish this past from the “temporal colonial/epistemic difference” with the Middle Ages. What happened in the Arabic-Islamic world? The historical and epistemic rupture between Avicenna and Averroës. (I notice, in passing, that when I type

Aristotle nothing happens. But when I type *Avicenna* and *Averroës* the electronic dictionary does not recognize them and offers other word possibilities. Avicenna and Averroës are out of the memory of [Western] modernity.) Averroës then would be the equivalent to Descartes in the history of Arab-Islamic philosophy. According to al-Jabri, Averroës “entered history because he broke with the Avicennianism of ‘oriental’ philosophy. . . . He also broke with the manner in which theoretical thinking—both theological and philosophical—had addressed the critical relationship between religion and philosophy.” But, al-Jabri continues, Averroës did not limit himself to “rupture;” he also offered the possibilities of a “carry-on spirit.”³⁷ Thus, the point of articulation today, from the perspective of Arabic-Islamic philosophy, consists of a double task. One is to evaluate their own tradition and the other is to articulate their modern present with the hegemony of European modernity. Thus, the question is not so much what is modern and what is traditional but, rather, the structure of power and of the coloniality of power when it comes to the face-to-face of two modernities. One, secular European with a Christian/Latin foundation and expressed in the hegemonic languages of colonialism and imperialism. The other religious with a secular will, and that needs to be expressed in Arabic and in the languages of European modernity. The reverse process doesn’t apply. Modern European philosophers do not need to express themselves in Arabic. Arabic, from the perspective of Europe, is a language that is learned to “study” the Arabic-Islamic world but not a language from and in which one does philosophy or other practices of knowledge.

It is Averroës’s “method” in dealing with the past, that al-Jabri rescues with the will to implement it. This method consisted of the separation between the “instrument” and the “faith.” Al-Jabri quotes Averroës in the following passage, with the preface that for Averroës the Other were the philosophers of Ancient Greece and, therefore, he was able to make the distinction in the Other’s reason between the instrument and the subject matter, the method and the belief:

It is clear that for our purposes (i.e., the rational study of beings) we must resort to the theses of our precursors in this field, irrespective of whether or not the latter were of our own faith. One does not ask the instrument, e.g., the knife used in the ritual sacrifice whether or not it belonged to one of our fellow Muslim in order to make a judgment on the validity of the sacrifice. One asks of it only to be of suitable use. By

those who are not fellow Muslims, we mean those among the ancient ones who had pondered over these questions long before the birth of Islam. Under the circumstances, since all the laws of reasoning (logic and method) have already been perfectly laid down by the ancient ones, we ought to draw from their books by the handful, to find out what they have said about that. If it happens to be correct, we shall welcome it with open arms; if it were to contain something incorrect, we shall make sure to not it.³⁸

Al-Jabri draws the following conclusions from this excerpt. First, read the past as Averroës read his Others, the Ancient Greeks. Second, apply the same criteria to read the present in space—al-Jabri’s Others (in the same sense as Averroës’s: those who are not Muslims and speak Arabic), that is the hegemonic texts of the European modernity. This al-Jabri calls the “Averroist spirit.” And he explains,

I simply mean this: It must be made present in our thought, in our esteem and in our aspirations in the same way that the Cartesian spirit is present in French thought or that the spirit of empiricism, inaugurated by Locke and by Hume, is present in English thought, we would be bound to answer that only one thing has survived in each case. We could refer to it as the Cartesian spirit in France providing specificity to French thought, or the empiricist providing specificity to English thought. *Let us therefore construct our specificity upon what is ours and is particular rather than foreign to us.*³⁹

Al-Jabri is aware that in the Arab-Islamic world there are intellectuals that would prefer to go the other way: to “bring” European modernity to “traditional” Islam. He thinks that it is erroneous to imagine the future in that direction because, he argues, “when we ask the Arabs to assimilate European liberalism, we are in effect asking them to incorporate into their consciousness a legacy that is foreign to them with the themes that it raises, the problematic that it poses, and the languages in which it is expressed; a legacy which therefore does not belong in their history. A nation can only bring back to its consciousness a tradition that belongs to it, or something that pertains to that tradition. *As for the human legacy in general, with its universal attributes, a nation always experiences it within its own tradition and not outside of it.*”⁴⁰

Let me make a couple of final comments. I believe that al-Jabri's invitation to revamp Averroës's method would be embraced by many other intellectuals in the peripheral modernities of the modern/colonial world. And I believe that there will be a significant number of postmodern and North Atlantic intellectuals who would scratch their heads when they read the complicity between the spirit, the nation, and tradition in the prose of an Arab-Islamic intellectual, even if he is a progressive one. And they, the North Atlantic and postmodern intellectual may be right. We should be equally concerned by the complicities between the spirit, the nation, and tradition in both cases, the "tradition of European modernity" (Descartes and the spirit of France, Hume and the spirit of England) as well as the "tradition of the Arabic-Islamic world" and other worlds in similar subaltern position in relation to Europe and the epistemic privilege of the North Atlantic modernity.

Notes

- 1 See Robert Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Emma Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).
- 2 See Denys Hay, "The Medieval Notion of Europe and Its People," in *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968); Robert Bartlett, "The Expansion of Latin Christendom," in *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 950–1350.
- 3 Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Penguin, 2000), book 4, 8.2: 609.
- 4 Karl Marx, *Capital* (London: Penguin, 1976), vol. 1, chap. 33, 931.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 931–32.
- 6 This is the crucial point of the articulation of the modern/colonial world that Anibal Quijano has been theorizing since the late 1980s. According to Quijano, "The project being developed under the name of 'coloniality of power' refers to the overall frame of power, established worldwide since the sixteenth century, with the formation of the Atlantic commercial circuit and the so-called Discovery of America. Such overall frame has been constituted by the articulation of two fundamental axes. One of them was a system of domination of the subjectivity and establishment of authority, based and crossed by the idea of 'race' as the basic criteria of social and cultural classification of the entire planet. This is the 'racial frame of the coloniality of power.' The second was a system of control and exploitation of labor based in the articulation of all known systems of exploitations related to capitalism (for instance, social relation of the exploitation of waged labor) and, consequently, of the market. Given the dominant function of economy in this configuration it could be called 'the capital frame of the coloniality of power'" (personal communication, May 2001). Coloniality of power emerges for Quijano at the moment in which the

- “racial frame” and the “capital frame” work in tandem and complement each other. See Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Knowledge, and Latin America,” *Nepantla: Views from South* 1 (2000): 159–60; see also <http://www.clacso.org/libros/lander/10.pdf>.
- 7 Lewis Gordon, *Existencia Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 74.
 - 8 Francisco López de Gómara, *Hispania Vitrix* (Madrid: Editorial Iberia, 1946 [1552]), xx.
 - 9 Antonello Gerbi, *La disputa del Nuevo Mundo*, trans. Antonio Alatorre (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1958), 129–95.
 - 10 For an overview on this issues, see Antonio-Enrique Perez Luño, *La polémica sobre el Nuevo Mundo: Los clásicos españoles de la Filosofía del Derecho* (Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 1992). This topic that has been extensively discussed, and continues to be so in Spain, Europe, and Latin America, has recently received the attention of postcolonial legal studies. For a general, well-informed although somewhat superficial debate (in the context of the existing debate published in Spanish), see the presentation in English by Antony Anghie, “Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law,” in *Laws of the Postcolonial*, ed. Eve Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 89–108.
 - 11 I have analyzed this overarching discourse of the modern/colonial world as Occidentalism. See Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). For an earlier formulation of this critique, see Fernando Coronil, “Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Non-Imperial Geohistorical Categories,” *Cultural Anthropology* 11 (1996): 52–87.
 - 12 See Quijano, “Coloniality of Power,” n. 6, and Mignolo, *Local Histories*, 3–48.
 - 13 For a brilliant analysis of the reconfiguration of “racial” classifications in eighteenth-century secular philosophy, see Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology,” in *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader*, ed. E. C. Eze (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 103–40.
 - 14 See Theodoro W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race: Racial Oppression and Social Control*, vol. 1 (New York: Verso, 1994), 1–26, 71–90.
 - 15 Eze, “The Color of Reason.”
 - 16 Walter D. Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism,” *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 721–48.
 - 17 On the racial configuration of the concept *human being* in European history and philosophy and the ethical, political, and epistemic consequences of such configuration, see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), and Gordon, *Existencia Africana*, 62–95.
 - 18 Michel Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société: Cours au Collège de France, 1975–1976* (Paris: Du Seuil/Gallimard, 1977), 217–39. I am quoting from the Spanish translation, *Defender la sociedad*, trans. Horacio Pons (Mexico: Fondo Cultura Económica, 1997).
 - 19 Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Victor Lyle Dowdell (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996).
 - 20 Editorial from the journal *History of European Ideas*, the official journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, sponsored by the European Cultural Founda-

tion. I am quoting from volume 6, a special issue entitled “Europe and Its Encounter with the Amerindians.” With the exception of the article by Rolena Adorno, the entire issue is *unidirectional and monotypic*. That is, there is no concern about the “Anahuac, Tawantinsuyu, and their encounter with the Europeans.” The indigenous people do not count because their function was precisely to be there in order for European narratives to build Europe and Europeans as “modern” and the Indians as “traditional.” Here we have at work a reviling trick, or strategy, as to how tradition is a construction of modernity and not a “reality” in itself. Tradition is the exteriority, the outside created from the perspective of the outside.

- 21 This text is, of course, my own version based on the previous one, the text from the *History of European Ideas*.
- 22 José Antonio Maravall, *Los factores de la idea de progreso en el Renacimiento español: discurso leído el día 31 de marzo de 1963 en el acto de su recepción pública* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1963); José Antonio Maravall, *Estado moderno y mentalidad social (siglos XV a XVII)* (Madrid: Alianza, 1972); José Antonio Maravall, *Estudios de historia del pensamiento español* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1973).
- 23 Edmundo O’Gorman, *La invención de América: El universalismo de la cultura occidental* (Ciudad de México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1958).
- 24 See “Decolonizing the Middle Ages,” ed. John Dagenais and Margaret Greer, a special issue of *The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 30 (2000). While *decolonization* was introduced to map the movements of “independence” from Europe in Latin America, Asia, and Africa and, therefore, was implicitly spatial, the “independence” from the Middle Ages in the Renaissance is implicitly temporal. However, and in retrospect, the European Renaissance put in place two kinds of colonial matrix: temporal (colonizing the Middle Ages) and spatial (colonizing the Americas, and then Asia and Africa). The “double colonization” during the Renaissance allowed, for example, Europeans to colonize the memories as well as the space of the Amerindians. See Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). That is, traditions were invented temporally in Europe and spatially in America, Asia, and Africa.
- 25 See Vicente Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance*.
- 26 Coronil, “Beyond Occidentalism”; see also Fernando Coronil, “Towards a Critique of Globalcentrism: Speculations on Capitalism’s Nature,” in “Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism,” ed. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, a special issue of *Public Culture* 12.2 (2000): 23–53; Walter D. Mignolo, “Postoccidentalismo: el argumento desde América Latina,” *Cuadernos Americanos* 67 (1998): 143–65.
- 27 Paget Henry, *Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2000).
- 28 Mignolo, *Local Histories*.
- 29 Manuel Moreno Friginals, “Aportes culturales y deculturación,” in *La historia como arma y otros estudios sobre esclavos, ingenios y plantaciones* (Barcelona: Critica, 1999), 24–29.

- 30 Ibid., 25–26.
- 31 See Gerbi, *La disputa del Nuevo Mundo*, 47–101.
- 32 Janet Ahud-Lugod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System, A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- 33 Claude Nicolet, *Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 90.
- 34 See O’Gorman, *La invención de América*.
- 35 See Partha Chaterjee, “Talking about Our Modernity in Two Languages,” in *A Possible India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 263–85.
- 36 Mohamed Abed al-Jabri, *Introduction à la critique de la raison arabe* (Paris: Du Seuil, 1994). There is an abridged translation in English, *Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique*, trans. Azioz Abbassi (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1999).
- 37 Al-Jabri, *Introduction a la critique de la raison arabe*, 123.
- 38 Ibid., 127.
- 39 Ibid., 128.
- 40 Ibid., 129.